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THE “DOUBLE-EDGED” DILEMMA: THE 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DEVALUATION OF 
MENTAL HEALTH MITIGATORS IN EVANS 
v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS 
ERIK THOMPSON* 
Abstract: In Evans v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied habeas corpus relief to a death 
row inmate who claimed that ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced his 
death sentence hearing. Despite the defense counsel’s omission of evidence 
suggesting that the inmate suffered from various mental disabilities, the court 
resolved that such evidence would not have affected the jury’s ultimate recom-
mendation of the death sentence because some of the evidence was stigmatized. 
This standard creates a burden that is far too great for individuals facing the 
death penalty and significantly minimizes the mitigating value of mental disabil-
ities. The Eleventh Circuit should have adopted the “probing and fact-specific” 
analysis proposed by Judge Martin in her dissenting opinion, which examines 
whether a lower court properly gauged the value of the mental health evidence. 
This analysis would better protect prisoners suffering from mental disorders 
from undeserved death sentences. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 19, 2010, Wydell Evans, a convicted murderer on death 
row, challenged his death sentence before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, seeking habeas corpus relief on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.1 Evans claimed that his defense counsel made no ef-
fort to investigate, discover, or present mitigating evidence of his mental 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, (2013–2014). 
 1 See Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans III), 703 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2742 (May 28, 2013); Notice of Appeal at 1–2, Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. 
(Evans I), No. 6:07-cv-897-Orl-28KRS, 2010 BL 228274, at *10, 12 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2010), 
rev’d, 681 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013); see also 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (providing the standard 
of review for a habeas corpus application); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) 
(stating that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during a death sentencing hearing raises a 
habeas claim). 
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and behavioral disorders to the sentencing jury.2 In conjunction with the 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, Evans purported to show that 
he was prejudiced by the defense counsel’s failures at sentencing.3 Evans 
argued that the omitted evidence confirmed that he suffered from anti-social 
personality disorder, a mental illness that may have dissuaded the jury from 
recommending the death penalty.4 
The majority of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, denied Evans’ 
habeas petition, agreeing with Florida state courts that Evans was not preju-
diced because the mental health evidence, weighed cumulatively, would 
have been more harmful than helpful before a jury.5 One circuit judge dis-
sented, stating that the majority’s reading of the more harmful than helpful 
standard was erroneous because the jury was already aware of Evans’ im-
pulsive and violent history, but had no knowledge of his mental health dis-
orders.6 The absent mental health evidence may have formed the crux of a 
statutory mitigator.7 This could have reduced the death sentence to a more 
prudent life sentence under Florida law.8 Accordingly, the dissenting judge 
concluded that the majority failed to recognize that the defense counsel’s 
error entirely precluded relevant evidence from reaching the jury during a 
death sentence hearing.9 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1322, 1325. Evans suffered from cognitive disorders including 
anti-social personality disorder and a severe impulse control disorder. Id. at 1322. The Florida 
death penalty statute mandates that the defendant have an opportunity at the sentencing hearing to 
present the jury with “mitigating circumstances,” including mental disturbances, which weigh 
against the death sentence. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1), (6)(b) (2010). 
 3 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1326 (explaining that in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the challenger must prove both an error in counsel and prejudice resulting from such an 
error). 
 4 See id. at 1348 n.10 (Martin, J., dissenting); Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *10, 12. 
 5 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1332–33 (majority opinion). The majority determined that because the 
mental health evidence included evidence of Evans’ violent and criminal history, it would have 
been more damaging to his case and would not have had any ameliorating effects. Id. 
 6 Id. at 1342–43 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 (ruling that the 
“more harmful than helpful” standard precludes habeas relief to a petitioner when the omitted 
evidence simply inculpates the petitioner further). The dissenting judge in Evans III understood 
that given the jury’s knowledge of Evans’ criminal past, the mental evidence only served a miti-
gating purpose. Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1342–43 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 7 The Eleventh Circuit uses the term “mitigator” to refer to mitigating circumstances. See 
Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1321. A “statutory mitigator” is a mitigating circumstance specifically enu-
merated in the Florida death penalty statute. See id.; see also § 921.141(6)(b)–(f) (including men-
tal disorders as mitigating circumstances). 
 8 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1338, 1345 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing to § 921.141(6)(b)–(f), 
which define the requirements for mental health statutory mitigators); see also § 921.141(2)(a)–(c) 
(stating that the jury is to determine whether the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances, warranting a life sentence over death sentence). 
 9 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1348 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
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As a result of the majority’s decision, a prisoner’s constitutional guaran-
tee of a thorough investigation into any legitimate mitigating factor during a 
death sentence hearing may be compromised.10 The court should have adopt-
ed the dissenting judge’s analysis, which tests whether the state courts pro-
vided adequate weight to the mitigating evidence under the particular circum-
stances of the individual offender.11 Such an approach would prevent state 
courts from unreasonably preventing mitigating mental health evidence with 
subjectively negative characteristics from reaching a jury, especially when 
such evidence might reasonably save the lives of prisoners undeserving of the 
death penalty.12 
I. THE CONVICTION, DEATH SENTENCE, AND EVANS’ STATE COURT 
PREJUDICE ALLEGATION 
On October 21, 1998, Wydell Evans fatally shot Angel Johnson, his 
brother’s seventeen-year-old girlfriend.13 The slaying occurred just two 
days after Evans was released from prison for an earlier parole violation and 
also while Evans was on probation for a different conviction.14 Evans and 
Johnson were passengers in a car driven by a mutual friend when they en-
gaged in a heated argument over Johnson’s fidelity to Evans’ brother.15 As 
the dispute escalated, Evans brandished a firearm and shot Johnson in the 
chest.16 Evans then threatened the driver and other passengers, forcing them 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (holding that the Constitution requires 
that the sentencing jury be aware of all relevant mitigating circumstances); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 
1338, 1348 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“[The] Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to 
guarantee a prisoner facing a death sentence a real investigation into his own life . . . .”). 
 11 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1339, 1348−49 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Evans v. Sec’y, 
Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans II), 681 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir.) (“Strickland requires a ‘probing and 
fact-specific analysis’ in evaluating the totality of the available evidence.”), vacated, reh’g granted 
en banc, 686 F.3d 1321, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013). The 
“probing and fact-specific analysis” is a threshold examination of the lower court’s prejudice ra-
tionale. See Evans II, 682 F.3d at 1254. The analysis investigates whether the lower court unrea-
sonably discounted or failed to appreciate the mitigating value of the evidence in question under 
the totality of circumstances. See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1344 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 12 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1342−43 (Martin, J., dissenting); Evans II, 681 F.3d at 1254 
(laying the framework for the “probing and fact-specific analysis”). 
 13 Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans II), 681 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g 
granted en banc, 686 F.3d 1321, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 
2013). 
 14 See Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans III), 703 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2742 (May 28, 2013); id. at 1342 (Martin, J., dissenting); Evans II, 681 F.3d at 
1244. Evans was on probation at this time for a previous conviction of felony possession of a 
firearm. Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1320 (majority opinion). 
 15 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1319. Evans accused Johnson of cheating on his brother. Id. 
 16 Id. During the argument, Evans became infuriated and punched the windshield of the car, 
cracking it. Id. Johnson laughed, Evans pulled the gun and ultimately shot her. Id. 
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to take him to another friend’s home where Evans acquired money and at-
tempted to wipe his fingerprints from the vehicle.17 Evans finally permitted 
the others to take Johnson to the hospital, though Johnson had already suc-
cumbed to the gunshot wound.18 The other individuals in the car identified 
Evans as Johnson’s killer.19 Evans stood trial in October of 1999 and was 
convicted of one count of kidnapping, one count of aggravated assault, and 
one count of first-degree pre-meditated murder.20 
During the death penalty hearing, both parties had opportunities to pre-
sent the sentencing jury with evidence of factors that would weigh for or 
against a death sentence.21 The state provided evidence of aggravating fac-
tors, including a previous conviction for aggravated battery, two previous 
convictions for battery on a law enforcement officer, and the fact that Evans 
was on probation for a previous felony at the time of the murder.22 Based on 
the evidence presented, the jury was aware of Evans’ multiple convictions, 
his violent tendencies, and his propensity to carry a gun.23 The trial court 
found two statutory aggravating circumstances based upon Evans’ history of 
violent criminal activity and probationary status at the time of the murder.24 
The defense attempted to mitigate the sentence by presenting the jury 
with testimony from family and friends who described Evans as a loving 
father, caring son, and a valuable contributor to society who counseled 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Id. at 1320. Evans threatened the other passengers that he would kill them and their families 
if they were to notify the police. See id. 
 18 Id. at 1319–20. 
 19 Id. at 1320. 
 20 Id.; Evans II, 681 F.3d at 1245. Evans premised his defense on the gun accidentally dis-
charging. Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1320. The jury, however, found convincing evidence to convict 
Evans of first-degree pre-meditated murder from the testimony of the other passengers, Evans’ 
previous threats to kill Johnson, and Evans’ attempts to cover up the crime. See id. at 1319−20. 
 21 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1320. The Florida death penalty statute provides that during the 
penalty phase, the sentencing jury must make findings of fact and weigh the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances presented by both parties. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1)–(3) (2010). 
 22 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1320. One conviction related to an incident in which Evans kicked a 
law enforcement officer in the groin, while another conviction involved Evans striking an officer 
in the throat. Id. at 1321. Under the Florida statute, “aggravating circumstances” weighing in favor 
of the death penalty include “(a) The capital felony was committed by a person previously con-
victed of a felony and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or on 
felony probation” and “(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of 
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” § 921.141(5)(a)–(b). 
 23 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1342 (Martin, J., dissenting). During the sentencing phase, the 
jury received a copy of Evans’ six prior convictions, including his previous conviction for felony 
possession of a firearm. Id. 
 24 § 921.141(5)(a)–(b); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1321. One aggravating circumstance was Evans’ 
previous assault convictions. § 921.141(5)(a). The second was Evans’ probationary status at the 
time of the slaying. § 921.141(5)(b). 
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youth to stay in school.25 The defense, however, failed to investigate, pre-
pare, or present to the jury any evidence of Evans’ mental condition.26 In-
stead, the defense counsel relied exclusively on the positive aspects of Ev-
ans’ character, primarily because the defense counsel did not believe that 
Evans suffered from any mental disorder, despite evidence to the contrary.27 
The trial court found five non-statutory mitigators from the character testi-
mony of defense witnesses, but did not find any statutory mitigators.28 The 
jury ultimately recommended the death sentence by a vote of ten to two.29 
Evans filed for post-conviction relief, seeking a stay of his death sen-
tence due to ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.30 To support his 
claim, Evans presented the Florida trial court with new mitigating evidence 
concerning his mental health and possible brain damage, which his defense 
counsel had failed to introduce.31 Lay witnesses for the defense testified that 
Evans had sustained a head injury when he was three years old and was 
struck by a car, resulting in learning and cognitive impairments.32 The wit-
ness’ testimony further demonstrated that Evans had a lengthy history of 
impulse control problems, violence towards women and authority figures, 
and substance and alcohol abuse.33 Two mental health experts for the de-
fense analyzed Evans’ behavioral history and concluded that it proved that 
Evans suffered from an aggressive impulse control disorder and other learn-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1320. Testimony from Evans’ friends and family established that 
Evans was very close to his children and supported his elderly grandmother. Id. at 1320−21. The 
defense also presented evidence that Evans counseled children in programs to keep them away 
from trouble by staying in school. Id. at 1320. 
 26 See id. at 1321. 
 27 See id. at 1341 (Martin, J., dissenting). The defense counsel relied on Evans’ own assertion 
that he was in “perfect” mental health. Id. At the time, there was a record indicating that Evans 
received a mental health review as a child, but the defense counsel did not investigate it further. Id. 
 28 See id. at 1321 (majority opinion); see also § 921.141(6) (defining the requirements for 
statutory mitigators). Good character evidence constitutes “non-statutory” mitigating factors, 
which do not weigh heavily against statutory aggravating factors. See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1340 
(Martin, J., dissenting); Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090, 1097 (Fla. 2002). 
 29 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1321 (majority opinion). 
 30 See id. at 1321–22. 
 31 See id. The new evidence was necessary to satisfy the two-pronged Strickland test for inef-
fective assistance of counsel, which requires the defendant to show that the counsel erred and that 
the petitioner was prejudiced by the error. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324. Both the Florida trial court and the Florida Supreme Court 
applied the Strickland prejudice analysis to Evans’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim; the 
same standard was applicable for Evans’ federal habeas claim. See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324. 
 32 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1322. 
 33 See id. at 1322–23. Evans’ mother testified that he had an “explosive temper.” Id. at 1323. 
Evans’ brother characterized him as “the angriest, most aggressive person [he had] ever met.” Id. 
Witnesses also testified that Evans, on occasion, had beaten up his girlfriends and pulled weapons 
on several friends. See id. Former special education teachers and counselors stated that as a child 
he was “more disturbed than the other students . . . .” Id. 
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ing disabilities, directly attributable to the brain damage caused by the car 
accident.34 
Although the state’s mental health expert agreed with the defense’s 
proposition that Evans sustained brain damage as a result of the accident, 
the state’s expert testified that the injury did not affect Evans’ decision mak-
ing when he killed Johnson.35 Both the defense and state experts agreed, 
however, that Evans likely suffered from anti-social personality disorder.36 
The defense experts insisted that Evans’ impulse control disorder and his 
anti-social personality disorder met the criteria for two statutory mitigators 
in the state of Florida.37 
Despite the new evidence, the Florida trial court denied Evans relief on 
the grounds that the defense counsel was not ineffective during the penalty 
phase and that Evans had not established prejudice.38 On appeal, the Florida 
Supreme Court applied the Strickland rule, which requires the challenger to 
demonstrate that, but for his attorney’s error, there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that the outcome would have been different.39 Under the Strickland 
framework, the Florida Supreme Court determined that there was no preju-
dice because the evidence created a “double-edged sword.”40 That is, the 
Florida Supreme Court recognized that Evans suffered from mental health 
disorders, but the court also found that the evidence proving such disorders 
would introduce to the jury additional evidence of Evans’ history of vio-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See id. at 1322. 
 35 See id. 
 36 Id. at 1322. Anti-social Personality Disorder is defined by a person’s persistent acts of de-
linquency and failure to conform to social norms. See Stéphane A. De Brito & Sheilagh Hodgins, 
Antisocial Personality Disorder, in PERSONALITY, PERSONALITY DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 133 
(Mary McMurran & Richard Howard eds., 2009). 
 37 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1322; see FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(b)–(f) (2010); Evans III, 703 F.3d 
at 1345 (Martin, J., dissenting). For a mental health mitigator to exist under the Florida statute, the 
individual must have committed the crime under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or the 
individual must have been in such a state that he or she could not appreciate the criminality of the 
conduct. § 921.141(6)(b)–(f). If the jury determined that Evans indeed met the criteria for two 
statutory mitigators, the jury could have reasonably weighed the statutory mitigating circumstanc-
es more favorably against the two aggravating circumstances. See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1348–49 
(Martin, J., dissenting). The effect may have been a life sentence rather than the death penalty. See 
§ 921.141(3); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1349 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 38 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324. The Florida trial court found that the defense counsel per-
formed within American Bar Association standards for assistance and that there was no prejudice 
due to the multitude of harmful evidence presented during the initial sentencing and post-
conviction proceedings. See Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d at 12. 
 39 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1326. 
 40 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324; Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d at 13. The “double-edged 
sword” metaphor refers to evidence that is mitigating in some regard, but is equally or more harm-
ful to the defendant’s case. See Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d at 13 (quoting Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 
415, 437 (Fla. 2004)). 
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lence towards women, outbursts against authority figures, and apparent 
pride in being a “jack-boy.”41 Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the mental health evidence 
would likely be more aggravating than mitigating before a jury.42 Evans 
subsequently petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida for a writ of habeas corpus on multiple claims, including ineffective 
assistance of counsel.43 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RECITE THE “MORE 
HARMFUL THAN HELPFUL” PREJUDICE STANDARD 
In order to analyze Evans’ habeas claim, both the district court and the 
Eleventh Circuit applied the deferential standard of review set out in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).44 Under 
AEDPA, the federal court must provide deference to issues reasonably ad-
judicated in state court.45 Both courts found that the prejudice issue was 
reasonably adjudicated on the merits because the Florida Supreme Court 
correctly identified and applied the “more harmful than helpful” analysis to 
Evans’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim.46 Therefore, the federal 
courts placed a heavy burden on Evans to show that the Florida Supreme 
Court committed a flagrant error.47 
A. The District Court Concurs with the Florida Supreme Court’s 
Application of the Strickland Framework 
The district court concluded that Evans failed to show a reasonable 
probability that the outcome of his sentencing would have been different 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324; Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans I), No. 6:07-cv-
897-Orl-28KRS, 2010 BL 228274, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2010), rev’d, 681 F.3d 1241 (11th 
Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013). A “jack-boy” is a slang term for a per-
son who commits armed robbery. See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324. Allegedly, Evans frequently 
robbed drug dealers. Id. 
 42 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324; Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d at 13. 
 43 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324; Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *9. 
 44 See Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans III), 703 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2742 (May 28, 2013); Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans I), No. 6:07-cv-
897-Orl-28KRS, 2010 BL 228274, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2010), rev’d, 681 F.3d 1241 (11th 
Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). The relevant portion of the Act provides that there 
shall be deference to the judgment of a state court, unless the decision was “contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of” federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 45 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1325–26. 
 46 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1327; Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *19. 
 47 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1327 (stating that the court must be “highly deferential” to the 
state court, and the burden on the challenger is “substantial”); Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *19. 
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had the jury reviewed the mental health evidence.48 Although the district 
court admitted that the evidence presented during the post-conviction pro-
ceedings likely established that Evans suffered from mental health disor-
ders, the district court determined that the jury would have nevertheless 
recommended the death sentence.49 The district court reasoned that the jury 
would not have been swayed by the mental incapacity assertion because 
Evans testified that he was wholly aware of his surroundings and relatively 
in control of himself when he shot Johnson.50 Additionally, the district court 
cited the multitude of aggravating evidence against Evans, including his 
assault convictions, history of violence, and affinity for guns.51 The district 
court also emphasized the “more harmful than helpful” paradigm and held 
that the effect of the new evidence was more aggravating than mitigating.52 
Evans appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit.53 
B. The Eleventh Circuit, Sitting En Banc, Heightens the Challenger’s 
Burden Within the Strickland Framework 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc majority agreed with the dis-
trict court that the Florida courts reasonably and appropriately applied 
Strickland as the controlling law.54 Evans thus sustained a substantial bur-
den of proof in demonstrating that the mitigating evidence introduced at 
post-conviction was “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of 
his sentencing.55 The circuit court further developed this substantially high 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1324−25; Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *19. 
 49 See Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *19. 
 50 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1325; Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *19, (citing Sears v. Upton, 
130 S. Ct. 3259, 3266 (2010)). The district court was “permitted to speculate how the mitigation 
evidence presented during the state post-conviction proceedings would have affected the outcome 
of the penalty phase.” Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *19. 
 51 See Evans I, 2010 BL 228274, at *19. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See Notice of Appeal at 1–2, Evans I, 2010 BL 228274. Evans initially appealed to a three-
judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans II), 681 F.3d 1241, 
1244 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 686 F.3d 1321, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d en 
banc, 703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013). Judge Martin, writing the panel opinion, reversed the dis-
trict court ruling and granted Evans habeas relief. See id. at 1270. Judge Martin applied a thresh-
old test and determined that under the circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably 
applied Strickland in failing to recognize that the jury was already aware of the harmful aspects of 
the mental health evidence, but was not aware of the mitigating aspects. See id. at 1264, 1270. 
Upon the state’s request for a rehearing en banc, however, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel 
judgment and reviewed the case en banc. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 686 F.3d 1321, 1322 
(11th Cir. 2012) (granting a rehearing en banc). 
 54 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1327. 
 55 Id. at 1326. 
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threshold, citing a recent Supreme Court decision holding that prejudice 
does not exist when the evidence is “not clearly mitigating and would have 
opened the door to powerful rebuttal.”56 Thus, under the majority’s con-
struction of the prejudice analysis, the court could only find prejudice to 
exist where no aggravating stigma accompanied the mental health evidence 
introduced at post-conviction.57 
Although the evidence presented at Evans’ post-conviction hearing 
supported mental health mitigating circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit ma-
jority explained that the evidence also introduced Evans’ long history of 
violence at school, aggression towards women and police, and affinity for 
guns and unlawful activity.58 The court determined that the mental disability 
evidence was not clearly mitigating, as it would have also introduced more 
damaging evidence.59 Thus, the circuit court determined that the Florida 
Supreme Court was justified in denying Evans relief.60 
While the Eleventh Circuit clearly established its support for the state 
courts’ decisions, the circuit court’s en banc majority went a step further, 
highlighting the nature of Evans’ mental health conditions.61 The court ex-
plicitly stated that evidence of Evans’ anti-social personality disorder alone 
would be more harmful than mitigating because jurors do not perceive the 
mental disorder favorably.62 Because there was proof a subjectively unfa-
vorable mental disorder was accompanied by aggravating evidence, the cir-
cuit court ruled that the Florida Supreme Court was not unreasonable in 
holding that Evans failed to establish prejudice as a result of his counsel’s 
performance at sentencing.63 
The majority’s opinion was met with a strong dissent from Judge Mar-
tin.64 Though she recognized Evans’ atrocious crime, Judge Martin con-
cluded that Evans was nonetheless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus be-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See id. at 1327 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011)). 
 57 See id. at 1327, 1333 (holding that it is reasonable for the state court to speculate that nega-
tive aspects of the evidence may have led a jury to believe that the defendant was beyond rehabili-
tation and inevitably deserving of the death sentence). 
 58 See id. at 1333. 
 59 See id. at 1328, 1332–33. 
 60 See id. at 1327. 
 61 See id. at 1328. 
 62 Id. at 1328 (citing Suggs v. McNeil, 609 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir. 2010) (observing that 
psychopathy is “‘a trait most jurors tend to look disfavorably upon.’” (quoting Reed v. State, 875 
So. 2d 415, 437 (Fla. 2004)))); see De Brito & Hodgins, supra note 36, at 133 (detailing anti-
social personality disorder). An individual with anti-social personality disorder cannot control his 
emotional impulses, which often results in aggressive and violent behavior. De Brito & Hodgins, 
supra note 36, at 133. The disorder is commonly confused with psychopathy, although psychopa-
thy is a more aggressive form of anti-social personality disorder. See id. 
 63 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1327, 1333. 
 64 See id. at 1338 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
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cause the state courts unreasonably precluded the only statutorily relevant 
evidence from reaching the sentencing jury.65 Judge Martin indicated that 
the sentencing jury was the same jury that convicted Evans and, therefore, 
was aware of both Evans’ violent tendencies and his affinity for guns, in 
addition to his criminal history.66 The jury was not aware, however, of Ev-
ans’ mental health disorders or of the brain damage that resulted from a car 
accident when he was a child.67 This evidence would have only helped Ev-
ans at the sentencing phase because the jury was already well acquainted 
with the aggravating evidence.68 
Under this construction of the facts, the state courts could not reasona-
bly conclude that the evidence actually posed a “double-edged sword” be-
cause the only evidence omitted at sentencing was the mitigating mental 
health factor. 69 Accordingly, Judge Martin subjected the Florida Supreme 
Court’s holding to de novo review and found that Evans’ case satisfied both 
the prejudice and ineffective assistance of counsel requirements for habeas 
relief. 70 
III. CIRCUIT JUDGE MARTIN’S “PROBING AND FACT SPECIFIC” REVIEW 
The Eleventh Circuit’s rigid application of the “more harmful than 
helpful” standard in Evans v. Secretary, Department of Corrections creates 
an unreasonably high threshold for death row prisoners to establish preju-
dice.71 The decision leaves prisoners with the nearly impossible task of 
demonstrating that there is no stigma whatsoever related to the mitigating 
evidence that was negligently omitted during the sentencing phase.72 The 
court should have adopted the analysis set out in Judge Martin’s dissent, 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See id. As opposed to the non-statutory character testimony presented by Evans’ trial coun-
sel, the mental health evidence could have established a statutory mitigator to weigh heavily 
against the death sentence. See id. at 1340; Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090, 1097 (Fla. 2002). 
 66 Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1342 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 1342–43. 
 68 Id.; Morton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 684 F.3d 1157, 1168 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding 
that anti-social personality disorder is a “valid mitigating circumstance for trial courts to consider” 
under Florida law). The jury could have reasonably weighed the statutory mitigating circumstanc-
es more favorably against the two aggravating circumstances. See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 148–49 
(Martin, J., dissenting). The effect may have been a life sentence rather than the death penalty. See 
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2010); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1349 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 69 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1345, 1347 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 70 Id. at 1347. 
 71 See Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans III), 703 F.3d 1316, 1338 (11th Cir. 2013) (Mar-
tin, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2742 (May 28, 2013). Judge Martin criticized the ma-
jority’s decision, arguing that it neglected Evans’ right to be fully heard while facing the death 
penalty. Id. 
 72 See id. at 1348. 
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which tests whether the state courts provided adequate weight to the miti-
gating evidence under the particular circumstances of the individual offend-
er.73 
Judge Martin’s “probing and fact specific” standard provides a reason-
able balance between the governing standards of review and the prisoner’s 
rights during a death penalty hearing.74 Under this analysis, the federal 
courts do not defer so readily to a state court’s correct citation of Strickland 
as controlling law.75 Rather the courts would ask as a threshold question 
whether the state court gave reasonable weight to the mitigating evidence, 
given the particular facts.76 In an appeal as dire as a death sentence chal-
lenge, the Eleventh Circuit should not have burdened Evans solely because 
of the court’s assumptions regarding his mental health disorders.77 
A review that initially tests a state court’s application of the Strickland 
framework is not unprecedented.78 Judge Martin’s analysis echoes that of 
the Supreme Court in Porter v. McCollum.79 Like the counsel in Evans, the 
defendant’s counsel in Porter failed to investigate and present mental health 
evidence to the sentencing jury, yet during a post-conviction proceeding, the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled that Porter did not prove prejudice.80 The Su-
                                                                                                                           
 73 See id. Here, the circumstances showed that the jury was well aware of a host of evidence 
speaking to his propensity for violence, including his criminal past. Id. The jury, however, was 
completely unaware of his mental disorders. Id. 
 74 See id. at 1338, 1348–49; Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs. (Evans II), 681 F.3d 1241, 1254 
(11th Cir.) vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 686 F.3d 1321, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 
703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 75 Evans II, 681 F.3d at 1261 (holding that a court must also ask whether the state court adju-
dication of prejudice involved an unreasonable application of Strickland and explaining that an 
unreasonable application in light of the facts warrants granting of the writ of habeas corpus under 
AEDPA). 
 76 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1338, 1348–49 (Martin, J., dissenting); Evans II, 681 F.3d at 
1261. 
 77 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1338, 1339 (Martin, J., dissenting) (stating that the AEDPA im-
poses a “difficult to meet” burden, but affords a less difficult de novo review where the state 
court’s application of federal law was unreasonable (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 
786 (2011)). The majority imposed the “difficult to meet” burden on Evans and agreed with the 
Florida Supreme Court that evidence of Evans’ mental condition was more harmful than helpful. 
Id. at 1338. Judge Martin argued that the Eleventh Circuit majority applied this greater deference 
standard because it did not fully understand the value of Evans’ behavioral and impulse disorders. 
See id. at 1348. 
 78 See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1344 (Martin, J., 
dissenting). 
 79 See Porter, 558 U.S. at 39; Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1344 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 80 See Porter, 558 U.S. at 43. The defense counsel in Porter failed to introduce mitigating 
evidence to the sentencing jury, including evidence of Porter’s military service, the mental and 
emotional disorders he developed as a result of his combat experience, and his abusive childhood. 
Id. at 43–44. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and held that it was likely more 
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preme Court in Porter overturned the Florida court’s decision, holding that 
the Florida Supreme Court irrationally applied Strickland as it “was not rea-
sonable to discount entirely” the value of the mitigating evidence.81 Judge 
Martin’s approach similarly reviews the application of the Strickland prin-
ciples to the facts, particularly whether the state court’s Strickland analysis 
discounted the convict’s mental frailties while granting too much weight to 
the supposed negative impact of such evidence.82 
The Eleventh Circuit should have adopted Judge Martin’s standard for 
reviewing a prisoner’s habeas claim of prejudice at sentencing because it 
protects the prisoner’s right to a fair hearing and safeguards against unrea-
sonable judgments that discount the value of mitigating evidence.83 Without 
this analytical precaution, adjudication of prejudice based upon unreasona-
ble character judgments will be afforded the highest deference upon review 
and may lead to unwarranted death sentences for persons suffering from 
mental illnesses.84 Instead, the majority opinion creates a dangerous prece-
dent that may jeopardize a convict’s life if the reviewing court cannot truly 
appreciate the nature of the defendant’s mental health issues.85 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision failed to protect Evans’ consti-
tutional guarantee of a fair death sentence hearing in which all mitigating 
evidence reaches the jury. The majority’s decision places too great a burden 
on a death sentence challenger to show that the mitigating evidence omitted 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel was unequivocally mitigating. Be-
cause ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing is always a substantial 
                                                                                                                           
harmful than helpful, especially his military service record because Porter went AWOL during 
combat. Id. at 43. 
 81 See id. at 43–44. The Supreme Court stated that it was unreasonable for the Florida Su-
preme Court to conclude that the negative aspects accompanying the evidence would have nulli-
fied its mitigating value. Id. at 43. Rather, the evidence was so relevant to Porter’s plea for a life 
sentence that the Supreme Court determined that the evidence could have swayed the sentencing 
jury despite the aggravating implications. See id. at 44. 
 82 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1338, 1345, 1348–49 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin ar-
gued that the Florida Supreme Court irrationally held that the mental health evidence was incon-
sequential simply because the jury may have learned of other negative facts about Evans. Id. at 
1345. It is important to note that the “new” negative facts the jury would have learned, including 
Evans’ troubled childhood, drug use, and additional illicit activity, would not have amounted to 
statutory aggravating factors, whereas the mental health disorders may have been statutory miti-
gating factors. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (5), (6)(b) (2010); Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1348–49 (Mar-
tin, J., dissenting). 
 83 See Evans III, 703 F.3d at 1344, 1348 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 84 See id. at 1344, 1338–1339. 
 85 See id. at 1344, 1348. 
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threat to prisoners facing the death sentence, the standard to review preju-
dice should not present such an unreasonably high threshold for these chal-
lengers. This especially applies to prisoners suffering from mental health 
disorders because evidence of mental health mitigators may require the 
presentation of some undesirable qualities, as was the case in Evans. The 
Eleventh Circuit should have adopted Judge Martin’s “probing and fact spe-
cific analysis” as a threshold review of the state court’s application of the 
Strickland prejudice test. Judge Martin’s analysis would ensure that a state 
court does not easily dismiss the significance of mental health as a mitigat-
ing factor simply because such evidence may be accompanied by immateri-
al insinuations. 
